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Case No. 940753-CA
Priority No. 15

Defendants/Appellees.

JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-2a-3(2)(l)(1992).
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ISSUES
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in determining that the marital property placed in
the Endrody Trust (approximate value $800,000), was not available for distribution to
plaintiff, thereby allowing the trust to control all of the parties assets and evict the plaintiff
from the family home and charge her $10,000 in back rent.
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to impute income to defendant based
upon his historical earnings and award plaintiff alimony consistent therewith.
3. Whether the Trial Court erred in not requiring defendant to account for property
sold during the divorce proceedings.
4. Whether the Trial Court erred in determining that the prenuptial agreement
precluded the plaintiff from receiving assets accumulated during the marriage.
5. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to award plaintiff attorney's fees in the
amount requested at trial.
6. Whether the plaintiff should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for this case is taken from Lee v. Lee, 714 P. 2d 1378 (Utah
App. 1987):
"In divorce proceedings the trial court has considerable discretion in
adjusting the financial interests of the parties. Argyle v. Argyle. 688 P. 2d
468 (Utah 1984). The determination of the value of the assets is a matter for
the trial court which will not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion. Turner v. Turner, 649 P. 2d 6 (Utah 1982). However, the trial
court must make findings on all material issues and its failure to do so
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted, incapable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
2

judgment. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987). The findings must
be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the
steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue presented

id."
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-1 et. seq., (as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PREFACE
This is a divorce case filed by plaintiff against the defendant. After several hearings
on various motions for temporary orders, including a motion for contempt against the
defendant, Laszlo Endrody Jr., the matter was tried before J. Philip Eves, District Judge,
who issued a memorandum decision and later findings of fact, conclusions of law and
decree of divorce. The plaintiff appealed the Court's decision relating to division of
property, alimony, violation of court orders and attorney's fees.
B. FACTS
Appellant/Plaintiff (wife) hereafter plaintiff, and Appellee/Defendant (husband)
hereafter defendant, are the principal parties to this action. The parties met in Iron County,
State of Utah, sometime in 1975. Defendant was employed by the Panama Canal
Commission and plaintiff was in the process of going back into the army as a sergeant,
intending to make the military her career (Tr. 200, 201). The marriage took place on April
11, 1975 and from that time until 1979, the parties lived in Panama where defendant
worked as a captain for the Panama Canal Commission and plaintiff delivered and cared
for the parties two (2) minor children (Tr. 201, 202). The defendant was making
3

approximately $24,000 per year in 1975 (Tr. 42) and in 1977 he was making approximately
$38,000 per year (Tr. 42). By 1986 the defendant was earning approximately $118,000
per year and he testified that his employment increased incrementally from $24,000 per
year in 1975 to $118,000 per year in 1986 (Tr. 44, 45, 46). In 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and
1991 until the filing of the divorce complaint, defendant made over $100,000 per year. See
income tax returns for those years (Exhibits P-2, P-3, Tr. 43 thru Tr. 50).
At the time of the marriage in 1975, defendant had a one-third (Vfe) interest in a farm
in Iron County, with some water rights

(P-1).

The total property consisted of

approximately 640 acres (Tr. 27) and a majority of the property was not under cultivation
at that time and did not have sprinkler lines and could not be irrigated. The property was
purchased for $80,000 (Tr. 27) with a $25,000 down payment made by defendant's
parents (Tr. 28) and yearly payments made by defendant (Tr. 28) until the balance plus
interest was paid in full. (Tr. 28, P-1). From the time of the purchase in 1970 until 1975,
the time of the marriage, the defendant did not make more than $24,000 per year and did
not have the funds to increase the value of the farm property (Tr. 42). During the marriage
plaintiff maintained the family home and the defendant pursued his employment and
investments (Tr. 201, 202). As captain for the Panama Canal Commission defendant was
required, during the early part of the marriage, to spend eleven (11) months per year in
Panama until approximately 1979 when his schedule was changed to allow him to spend
one (1) month at home and six (6) weeks in Panama (Tr. 233). From 1979 until the time
of the divorce, plaintiff lived in Iron County and was a homemaker caring for her husband
and the two (2) minor children (Tr. 233).

4

From 1975 until the time plaintiff filed for divorce, the assets of the parties increased
as follows:
1.

The farm property was improved with additional water rights,

additional

sprinkling lines (Tr. 41) and additional acreage under cultivation and was worth $437,000
at the time the divorce was heard (Tr. 225).
2. The parties purchased three (3) homes during the marriage which included a
Cedar City home valued at $62,000 (Tr. 225), an Enoch home valued at $105,000 (Tr
225), and a Garden Park home which was sold after the divorce was filed and netted
$36,135 (Tr. 228).
3. The parties purchased five (5) acres near the Garden Park home which was
valued at $25,000 (Tr. 227).
4. The parties purchased farm equipment which was appraised at $79,125 (Tr. 226
and 227) at the time of the divorce.
5. The parties had cattle on the Endrody Ranch property valued at $56,495 at the
time of the divorce and plaintiff admitted selling fifty seven (57) head of personal cattle
worth at least $30,000 in violation of the court order prior to the time of the divorce (Tr.
102) (see also, court order dated April 19, 1993).
6. The defendant created a corporation known as Endrody Trucking and the assets
of that company as set forth on the 1986 federal income tax return was $66,692 (Exhibit
P-2). Defendant claimed, without documentation, that fifty one thousand (51,000) shares
of that corporation (which represent a majority of the shares) were owned by the Endrody
Trust (Tr. 97).
5

Defendant testified that his income from the Panama Canal Commission was
$118,000 in 1986 (Tr. 44) and that he had a farm loss of $100,000 (Tr. 45). In 1987 the
parties tax return showed an income from the Panama Canal Commission of $103,291 and
a farm loss of $90,000 (Tr. 47). The parties tax return for 1988 showed an income of
$104,431 (Tr. 47) and a farm loss of $50,679 (Tr. 48). The parties income tax return for
1989 showed an income from the Panama Canal Commission of $109,432 and a farm loss
of $100,034. The parties tax return for 1990 showed an income of $121,000 (Tr. 49) and
a farm loss of $92,134 (Tr. 50).
The defendant created an entity known as the Endrody Trust in 1984 (P-1) and
claimed that almost all of the parties property was trust property at the time of the divorce.
The Endrody Trust, by its terms, allowed the defendant to treat the trust property as his
own (see Endrody Trust, P-9, particularly 1J12.4). During the marriage the defendant
conducted the financial affairs of the parties and the plaintiff signed the documents placed
in front of her for her signature (Tr. 204).
After the divorce complaint was filed, the defendant resigned as trustee of the
Endrody Trust and appointed his daughter (by another marriage) as trustee (D-15).
Defendant testified that he resigned as trustee of the trust because of the divorce (Tr.
118). Defendant also voluntarily resigned as a captain for the Panama Canal Commission
and also quit as a steward for Masters, Mates and Pilots lowering his income from
approximately $120,000 per year to a retirement amount of $2,420.40 per month.
Defendant testified that he could have continued his work with the Panama Canal
Commission for at least two (2) more years (Tr. 114). Defendant also resigned as
6

president of Endrody Trucking and had his daughter (by another marriage) installed as
president.
Defendant acknowledges that he was trustee and operator of the Endrody Ranch
all during the marriage and that he made all decisions relating to the ranch and the trust
by himself (Tr. 88). After the divorce was filed, defendant stated that he no longer
operated the ranch (Tr. 117) and contended that his daughter made the decisions relating
to the trust, the corporation and the ranch.
During the divorce proceedings all of the assets of Endrody Trust, Endrody
Trucking, together with the homes and other real property, the farm equipment, the cattle
(which were sold in violation of the court order), the hay and any other assets owned by
the parties (value approximately $800,000) were controlled by the defendant. In contrast,
at the same time, the plaintiff testified that she had no medical insurance and could not get
enough money together for needed surgery on her teeth (Tr. 207). She further testified
that she pawned what little jewelry she had for $300 and used that money for living
expenses and had no security to gain a loan (Tr. 210, 211). Her only funds consisted of
$786.46 which the court had awarded her on a temporary basis and she was renting a
portion of the house she was living in for $250. She was also getting a disability check for
$85, making her total income $1,121.46, and when the Judge finally made his decision
regarding the divorce, she was immediately evicted from the family home.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Issue relating to the Endrody Trust Property: Plaintiff and defendant

accumulated approximately $800,000 in marital assets during a seventeen (17) year
7

marriage. Approximately halfway through the marriage, defendant placed certain property
in a trust known as the Endrody Trust.

Some of the trust property was partially

documented and at trial, the defendant claimed that almost all of the property accumulated
by the parties during the marriage (with marital assets) was trust property. The Trial Court
accepted the defendants testimony regarding what property was owned by the trust, even
though said testimony was not properly documented. As an example, the defendant
testified that certain equipment and certain cattle belonged to the trust. There was no
documentation concerning how that property got into the trust or how the defendant made
such a determination. The Trial Court concluded that the majority of the property
accumulated by the parties during the marriage was trust property. The Trial Court then
ordered that five hundred fifty and one-half (550 V2) of the defendants shares in the trust
should be held by the defendant subject to a constructive trust imposed by the Trial Court
requiring defendant to hold title to those shares in trust for plaintiff and she was awarded
the voting rights and the right to any property distribution attributed to those shares. The
trust document, as testified by defendant, was an in-house document which could be
amended at will. This simply means that defendant was placed in a position to use that
property as he chooses, to transfer that property as he chooses and to issue additional
shares as he chooses, thereby making plaintiffs shares virtually worthless. It is plaintiffs
contention that the Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial Court, award plaintiff her
share of the trust property and give defendant credit for any premarital or separate
property.
2. Issue regarding alimony: The Trial Court found that defendant's income was
8

$120,000 per year at the time the divorce was filed. The evidence was undisputed that
defendant voluntarily quit all of his employment and was making approximately $2,500 per
month (from retirement) at the time of the trial. The Trial Court refused to take this
undisputed evidence into account when alimony was awarded. The Trial Court made an
alimony award of $300 per month based on a monthly income of $2,500. The plaintiff
is asking the Court of Appeals to reverse this decision and remand the matter to the Trial
Court for an alimony award consistent with a monthly salary of approximately $10,000 per
month.
3. Issue regarding sale of assets during the divorce process: The defendant
sold $30,000 worth of personal property during the divorce proceedings and was
instrumental in a sale of one of the trust homes which netted approximately $36,000. The
Trial Court did not require defendant to account for these assets and simply concluded that
the proceeds were used to reduce debt. These determinations were not set forth in the
findings of fact or the memorandum decision of the Trial Court and it is impossible to
determine why the Trial Court did not require defendant to account for the sale of those
assets.
4. Issue relating to prenuptial agreement: The Trial Court held the prenuptial
agreement valid and then concluded that the property covered by the prenuptial
agreement was improved, augmented and commingled with marital assets. The Trial
Court then awarded plaintiff shares in the trust which could be changed at will by the
defendant. It is plaintiffs position that the Court of Appeals should reverse and remand,
instructing the Trial Court to determine what property was covered by the prenuptial
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agreement or was premarital property which had not been augmented, improved or
commingled. After this decision is made, it is plaintiff's position that she be awarded one
half (1/£) of the property which is part of the martial estate.
5. Issue relating to attorney's fees: The Trial Court determined that the request
for attorney's fees submitted by plaintiffs attorneys were fair and reasonable. Plaintiffs
attorney's fees with costs total $37,033.75. The Court then awarded plaintiff $15,000 for
attorney's fees. The findings of fact and memorandum decision prepared by the court do
not set forth how the court arrived at its decision to reduce the attorney's fee award by
$22,033.75. Obviously the court found that the plaintiff was in need by awarding her
$15,000 in attorney's fees. It was incumbent upon the court to determine the procedure
used in reducing the attorney's fee award. The plaintiff now requests that the Court of
Appeals instruct the Trial Court to award plaintiff her reasonable attorney's fees and costs
totaling $37,033.75.
6. Issue relating to attorney's fees on appeal: The plaintiff contends that the
parties accumulated approximately $800,000 worth of marital assets over the period of a
seventeen (17) year marriage and that the Trial Courts award, in effect, gives her none of
that property. It is her position that if she prevails on appeal that the Court of Appeals
should determine that she is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee relating to the appeal
process.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
MARITAL PROPERTY PLACED IN THE ENDRODY TRUST
(APPROXIMATE VALUE $800,000) WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR
10

DISTRIBUTION TO PLAINTIFF, THEREBY ALLOWING THE TRUST TO
CONTROL ALL OF THE PARTIES ASSETS AND EVICT THE PLAINTIFF
FROM THE FAMILY HOME AND CHARGE HER $10,000 IN BACK RENT.
The personal income tax returns for Laszlo and Carolyn Endrody were admitted into
evidence as Exhibits P-2 and P 3 I he income tax returns Ior the Endrody Trust were
admitted into evidence as Exhibits P-5. These documents demonstrate a course of action
by Laszlo Endrody from at least 1986 until the complaint for divorce was filed, where Mr.
Endrody used Ins incnmp In iinpi'ove his mnrh property, a\ »"oid paying federal income taxes
and keep titles to any properties out of his wife's name. When asked concerning these
actions, the defendant testified that his accountant told I mi II nal I le would have to si IOW a
profit on the Endrody Ranch property every five (5) years (Tr. 50) although the tax returns
show the Endrody Ranch always lost money. The Trial Court decided, as set forth in the
findings of fact ar id conclusions of \m i-imIII mHnoranduin derision, "

plaintiff w

entitled to a small amount of equipment, no cattle, three thousand (3,000) shares in
Endrody Trucking and one half (1/4) of the shares in the Endrody linsi iiiiiHu in the n .Jim
the defendant, subject to a constructive trust to be held by defendant for the use and
benefit of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was also ordered to pay child support in the sum of $105
and given $300 per nH nitl i • v. | milinneril

MIIIIIIIK H

ly.»id assessed $10,000 in back

careful review of six hundred thirty-eight (638) pages of transcript taken during the trial of

property placed in the trust was not marital property that should be awarded to plaintiff.
After hearing the testimony and concluding the trial, the Trial Court issued a memorandum
decision which contained, among other things, the following:
11

I

"After the creation of the trust the defendant continued to make
improvements to the ranch, to buy and sell farm equipment to supply the
seed, labor and electrical power needs of the ranch, to farm and raise
livestock, and to pay rental payments to the trust for the use of the land and
water. The income generated by these activities was not the property of the
trust. The parties and the trust filed separate tax returns and for the years
1987 through 1990 those returns indicate that the farm was losing large
amounts of money and the defendant was using his earnings from the Canal
to pay many of the costs associated with running the ranch and buying the
equipment and supplies needed to do so" (Memorandum Decision pp 5 and
6).
"The defendant sent all his earnings home to his father, who handled the
defendant's banking. The father would see that the plaintiff was given
enough money to feed and care for the family until the defendant came home
on one of his long leaves" (Memorandum Decision pp 6).
"During the marriage, the parties or the trust acquired additional properties
which present issues in this case. In 1982, the parties bought a home in
Cedar City which they paid for with marital funds. The title to the home was
taken by the plaintiff and the defendant as trustees for the two (2) minor
children of the parties, Michael and Linda. After the trust was created, the
Cedar City home was transferred into the trust, with the agreement of both
the plaintiff and the defendant. Plaintiff received 70 additional shares in the
trust upon her agreement to transfer the Cedar City home to the trust.
Thereafter, the parties paid rent to the Trust for the use of the house. The
defendant has occupied this home during these proceedings and is being
assessed rent by the trust" (Memorandum Decision, pp 9).
"The defendant admits that he expected to inherit the ranch upon the death
of his parents prior to the creation of the trust. Since he has the majority of
the shares issued in the trust, he has treated the ranch as his own property
throughout the marriage and has spent a great deal of money and time on
improvements to the property. As of April 17, 1992, the ranch and
improvements thereon, including sprinklers, wells, water distribution lines,
buildings, two (2) mobile homes, corrals and fences, were appraised as
having a fair market value of $437,000" (Memorandum Decision pp 7).
"Since defendant is still the majority share holder in the trust and his
daughter is the current trustee, the court is convinced that defendant could
resume the position of trustee at will" (Memorandum Decision pp 9).
"During the time that the parties resided in that home, they paid rent to the
12

trust for the use of the premises. Patty Heinz, the current trustee of the trust,
has testified that once this divorce case is decided, the trust will seek the
ouster of the plaintiff from the Enoch home a n d will hold defendant
responsible for all losses the trust has suffered during the time the plaintiff
has occupied the home without paying the required rent" (Memorandum
Decision pp 9-10).
There was i

nentation submitted m i . II ly if thi:> exhibits that v

il< IIII « H II i mi •

to the conclusion that any rent was paid to the trust or that any rent was assessed against
III""1* III! a n d Mrs. Endrody by II! if" liusl 111 88). The 01 \\) evidence regarding rent payments
was submitted by Mr. Endrody (Tr. 88) and his daughter in verbal testimony (Tr. 410). It
is obvious that rent was never paid because the Trial Court found that $20,000 was due
in rent. The Court of Appeals held in Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P. 2d 585 (Utah App. 1993)
that issues concerning liens or debts supported only by the husband's testimony does not
pi ovide suffiiciei it evidence i
debts defendant claims were owed to the trust. The Court states in its memorandum
decision that rental payments were made, however, there was no evidence of that at the
trial ai id it is impossible to shovii Il

determined that $20,000 was due tc till ie

trust for back rent or what rental payments were made to the trust.
In Gardner v. Gardner, 7 H II" ,il II

I

III. illi lliHi'.|i llm urn I tidil lllluil

III;I

III.ill

property "encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties,
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.
2d 421 (Utah App. 1990), the Court held that "in dividing property between parties in a
divorce action, the overriding consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable." The
count quoted Bur t v. Bui t, i Li9 P ?\ ! 11 H»(I ltd! i Apfj I lJ»(11 . ti id Bun I quoted Newmever

v. Newmever. 745 P. 2d 1276 (Utah 1987). In this case, the testimony, as recited in the
statement of facts, together with the exhibits, including the income tax returns, and the
findings of the court clearly show that plaintiff and defendant took a $80,000 piece of
property and used the income from defendants employment over a period of fifteen (15)
years to turn that piece of property into a $437,000 asset which defendant treated as his
own and knew that he would inherit. The property was placed in the Endrody Trust along
with other investments accumulated by the parties during the marriage and the majority of
the parties assets (valued at over $800,000) were determined by the Trial Court, to be held
in the trust at the time the divorce was filed.
In the case of Lee v. Lee. 714 P. 2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals
dealt with a case where the husband and wife were married almost nine (9) years. Prior
to the marriage, the husband and his brother established a garbage collection business
in which the husband made a substantial monetary investment from personal assets.
Subsequent to the parties marriage, the husband and his brother sold the garbage
business and established D & D Equipment and Supply Inc. The husband owned fifty two
percent (52%) of the shares of D & D and the Trial Court awarded all of the husband's
interest in D & D exclusively to the husband. The Court of Appeals said that D & D was
established after the parties marriage and its value was actualized during the marriage and
therefore the wife was entitled to her share of that corporation. The court said the wife
made a significant contribution by taking care of the family home which freed the husband
to participate full time in running the business. In the instant case, the value of the
Endrody Trust was actualized during the marriage, the property was placed in the trust
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during the marriage and the plaintiff made a significant contribution by taking care of the
family home so that the defendant cc i ilcl participate in 11 ii;. i i iplcn 11 m m ml ai IK i 111 ipi 1 n/ornont
of the Endrody Ranch.
In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421 (Utah App. 1990), the Court made the
following footnote:
1.

"In appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be awarded property which
the other spouse brought into the marriage. Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P. 2d
1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988); see e.g.. Noble. 761 P. 2d at 1373; Moon v.
Moon, 790 P. 2d 52, 56 (Utah App. 1990); Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P. 2d
593, 595-6 (Utah App. 1988). The rationale behind this exception to the
general rule is that '(m)arital property' encompasses all of the assets of
every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P. 2d 820, 824 (Utah
App. 1989) quoting Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988),
and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion, divide the
property equitably, regardless of its source or time of acquisition. Noble,
761 P. 2d at 1373. Thus, there is no fixed formula for the distribution of
marital property, but, instead, the trial court has the power to divide property
and income so that the parties may readjust their separate lives to their new
circumstances as well as possible. Munns, 790 P. 2d at 119; Moon, 790 P.
2d at 56; Weston. 773 P. 2d at 410-11."
r

In Dunn v. Dunn,

g

other things, a professional corporation. The corporation was established during the
marriage and all of the assets were contributed by the husband who chose to work sixty
(60) to seventy (70) hours per week. The wife was left with the responsibility of managing
the household accounts and was left without the companionship and domestic
contributioi is of the husband. Shew

p

'business

• held

that her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth and practice of the business.
The court then determined that this was a marital asset. In the instant case, the trust was

created during the marriage and the majority of the parties assets were placed in the trust
and the wife took care of the children and took care of the household so that the husband
could devote his time and effort to his employment as a Panama Canal Sea Captain and
to maintaining and enhancing the investments.
In 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals decided the case of Watson v. Watson, 837
P. 2d 1 (Utah 1992), and dealt with the issues of corporate property, premarital property
and alimony. The court cited Colman v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782 (Utah App. 1987), for the
requirements necessary to set aside a corporate entity under the alter ego doctrine. That
quote follows:
"To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable alter ego doctrine, two
circumstances must be shown: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership
that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few
individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or result in an inequity."
The income tax returns, the testimony of Mr. Endrody and the memorandum
decision issued by the District Judge clearly show undisputed fact that the defendant was
the Endrody Trust and the Endrody Ranch and defendant used all of his income to
augment, supplement and develop the trust property.
The Watson case also dealt with premarital property and the court stated the
following:
"Premarital property, gifts and inheritances may be viewed as separate
property, and in appropriate circumstances, equity will require that each
party retain the separate property brought to the marriage. However, the
rule i[s] not invariable."
The court then quoted Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), for the
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following rule of law:
"In appropriate circumstances, one spouse may be awarded property which
the other spouse brought into the marriage. The rationale behind this
exception to the general rule is that '(m)arital property' encompasses all of
the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and
from whatever source derived,' Sorensen v. Sorensen. 769 P. 2d 820, 824
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P. 2d 1076, 1078 (Utah
1988), and that the trial court may, in the exercise of its broad discretion,
divide the property equitably regardless of its source or time of acquisition."
In Dunn, the court stated that pre-marital property may lose its separate distinction
where parties have commingled it into the marital estate. In this case, plaintiff contends
and the Trial Court agreed that the defendant treated the property as his own, that he
could return as trustee whenever he wanted to and that his income had been used to
augment the trust and that trust property and marital property had been commingled. As
set forth in the facts, title to the property was in the name of defendant and his parents and
then changed to the trust; one of the homes was purchased prior to the creation of the trust
and placed in the trust during the marriage, and it is important to note that the Trial Court
did not determine how the equipment and cattle got into the trust nor how trust property
was distinguished from marital property. There was no evidence submitted by the
defendant that anyone put anything into the trust other than the defendant. Defendant
stated at the trial, that from the time the trust was created until 1991 he treated the
operation of the trust property as his own (Tr. 92) and admits that he was the only person
who paid any money into the trust (Tr. 78). Defendant admits that no one paid for any of
their shares in the Endrody Trust (Tr. 71) and this leads to the conclusion that any shares
delivered to any beneficiary were delivered without consideration. The trust agreement
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provides, among other things, that the trustee may do the following:
"To do all acts, to institute all such proceedings and exercise all rights,
powers, and privileges that an absolute owner of property would have the
right to do, subject always to the discharge of the trustees fiduciary duties.
The enumeration of certain powers in this agreement shall not limit the
general or implied powers of the trustee, except those powers expressly
subject to the beneficiaries direction or approval." (P-9)
The trust agreement also provides that the trustee could only be removed by a
majority vote of the beneficiaries and that the trust agreement could be amended by the
majority of the shares in the trust. At the time of trial, the defendant still had the majority
of the shares in the trust and could determine who the trustee was at all times, and from
the inception of the trust until the time the divorce was filed, the defendant did what he
wanted regarding the trust and treated all of the trust property as his sole and separate
property. There is evidence throughout the trial which demonstrates that defendant
treated the property as his own. Exhibit "A" is attached to the trust and is supposed to
contain all of the trust property. This exhibit only contains the ranch property. The three
(3) homes acquired by the parties together with the five (5) acres of real property were
never listed as part of the trust or attached to the original trust document. The homes and
real property were deeded to the trust in the conveyances, and said deeds are the only
documents showing what property was placed in the trust. Defendant contended that the
cattle and machinery belonged to the trust and the court found that was true, however,
defendant never submitted any documentary evidence showing any cattle or machinery
being placed in the trust.
The evidence at trial was replete with violations of the trust. Defendant admitted
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that he sold real property in violation of the trust agreement (Tr. 123, 124). Defendant
admitted that he mortgaged trust property in violation of the trust agreement (Tr. 126).
Defendant admitted that his resignation as trustee was not done in accordance with the
trust agreement (Tr. 126,128,129,131). Defendant then testified that the trust is really
an in-house set of rules that the beneficiaries can amend (Tr. 125, 131). Defendant
testified that he had a majority of the shares of the trust and that a majority of the shares
could amend the trust (Tr. 136).
Even if the court determines that some of the property which is part of the Endrody
Trust was premarital or separate, this conclusion does not place said separate property
beyond the trial courts reach in an equitable property division. This court may award an
interest in said property to the plaintiff as part of an alimony award. Weaver v. Weaver.
442 P. 2d 928 (Utah 1968). The court could also determine that the trust property should
be sold and defendant given credit for the premarital property and the balance should be
divided between the parties. The plaintiff simply cannot understand why the court would
not even consider awarding her the home which was acquired in the name of Lazslo and
Carolyn Endrody during the marriage and transferred to the trust when the trust was
created.
The evidence at trial showed that the defendant took an early retirement from the
Panama Canal Commission and Masters, Mates and Pilots after the divorce was filed. He
did that in order to decrease his income from approximately $10,000 per month to
approximately $2,500 per month. In such a situation, the court may achieve equity by
awarding premarital property or separate property to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Bailev.
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745 P. 2d 830 (Utah App. 1987). Since the time the divorce was filed, the defendant has
sold one (1) of the homes, which was part of the trust property, and has appointed his
daughter (by a previous marriage), Patty Heinz, to be the trustee of the Endrody Trust and
has made transfers of trust shares and has done other things in an effort to dissipate the
marital assets. He claims he has retired as trustee of the Endrody Trust and has retired
from operating the Endrody Ranch and will not operate Endrody Trucking, and that his only
income is his retirement. All of these facts evidence an intent to avoid an equitable
distribution of the marital property and plaintiff is asking this Court to do equity by treating
all of the property as marital property. The evidence is clear that defendant will become
trustee of the trust and operate the ranch and become president of Endrody Trucking and
seek other employment after the appeal has been concluded.
II.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPUTE INCOME
TO DEFENDANT BASED UPON HIS HISTORICAL EARNINGS AND
AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY CONSISTENT THEREWITH.

The Trial Court agreed that the defendant was making approximately $120,000 per
year at the time the divorce complaint was filed (see Memorandum Decision).
Disregarding this obvious evidence, the Trial Court awarded the plaintiff alimony based
on defendant's retirement income of $2,500 per month, thereby awarding plaintiff $300
per month alimony. The Court of Appeals has often held that income can be imputed to
a party based on historical earnings. An analysis of imputation of income is set forth in Hill
v. HilL 841 P. 2d 722 (Utah App. 1994). In the HjN case, the Court of Appeals stated that
the trial court may impute gross income if it examines a parties historical and current
earnings to determine if under-employment or over-employment exists. The Court of
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Appeals also said that the trial court's findings must address the critical question of
whether the drop in earnings was voluntary. In the instant case, the Trial Court chose not
to impute income to the defendant in spite of overwhelming evidence that the defendant
was voluntarily under-employed. Defendant's income was reduced from $10,000 per
month to approximately $2,500 per month at a time when plaintiff demonstrated to the Trial
Court that she needed approximately $2,000 per month on which to live.
The defendant admitted that he discontinued all activities which would grant him
income because of the divorce. In contrast, plaintiff testified that she was trying to get a
secretarial degree so that she could do some work even though she testified that she did
not work during the marriage and that she stayed home and took care of the family. She
also testified at the time of the divorce, that she could not find work and could not even get
a loan (Tr. 210). At that same time (during the divorce process), Mr. Endrody received a
$7,000 federal income tax refund which was a result of the filing of joint returns (Tr. 212)
and plaintiff did not receive any of that money. He sold $30,000 worth of cattle and also
sold a home netting $36,135 and controlled all of the parties assets. Plaintiff testified that
she was in need of alimony, that she had no medical insurance (Tr. 217) and that she was
taking medications on a daily basis (Tr. 220). The medications she was taking including
the following: flexeril for spasms, corguard for blood pressure, Zantac for ulcers, and elavil
for depression. She testified that she could not get a job at that time (Tr. 222) and that the
constant threats to evict her from the family home had caused her depression and medical
problems (Tr. 231). It is plaintiffs contention that the Court of Appeals should determine
that the Trial Judge abused its discretion by not properly imputing income to the defendant
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and the matter should be remanded to the District Court to impute income consistent with
the evidence presented at trial, and make a proper alimony award.
III.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING DEFENDANT
TO ACCOUNT FOR PROPERTY SOLD DURING THE DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS.

The Trial Court issued an order on April 19, 1993 that the defendant had sold
approximately $30,000 worth of cattle in violation of the Trial Court's previous order. The
Trial Court then found that the defendant was in contempt of court for selling the cattle and
charged him $810 in attorney's fees. The Trial Court did not make the defendant account
for the proceeds. The findings of fact and the memorandum decision of the Trial Court did
not determine why the court did not include the $30,000 amount as part of the marital
estate. During the divorce proceedings one of the homes acquired by the parties with
marital assets was placed in the Endrody Trust and sold by the trustee of the trust, netting
$36,135.00. The Trial Court did not make the defendant account for those proceeds and
did not set forth in his findings of fact or memorandum decision why those proceeds should
not be accounted for. The plaintiff is requesting that the Court of Appeals require the Trial
Court to determine that these assets are part of the marital estate and award plaintiff her
share of same.
IV.

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT PRECLUDED THE PLAINTIFF FROM
RECEIVING ASSETS ACCUMULATED DURING THE MARRIAGE.

The Trial Court spent a great deal of time in its memorandum decision discussing
various cases which relate to prenuptial agreements.

The findings of fact and

memorandum decision submitted by the Trial Court demonstrate that the Trial Court found
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the improvements to the Endrody Ranch, the purchases of the homes and real property,
and the purchases of the cattle and equipment were accomplished with marital assets.
The Trial Court then awarded plaintiff the benefit of certain shares to be held in a
constructive trust by the defendant. This is virtually a worthless award, because the
defendant controlled the trust, can amend the trust at will, can issue additional shares, and
the Trial Court does not explain how the prenuptial agreement allows the court to award
the defendant possession and control of almost all of the parties marital assets.
It is plaintiff's position that even if the prenuptial agreement is valid, the property
which plaintiff has proved is marital property can still be distributed by the Trial Court in
accordance with justice and equity.
V.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT REQUESTED AT TRIAL.

In this case, the Trial Court determined that the plaintiffs evidence at trial showed
that she had incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $35,602.25 and costs in the amount
of $1,431.50. The evidence also showed that from the time the first temporary restraining
order and order to show cause was issued on March 21, 1991, until the trial, the court
issued an additional twelve (12) orders on an interim basis. Most of these orders and
interim hearings were scheduled of the request of the defendant. As an example, on June
20,1991, the defendant asked the court to evict plaintiff from the family home, (see order
dated July 9,1991). The court records also show that defendant hired and dismissed two
(2) attorneys before deciding to represent himself. The court determined that plaintiff was
entitled to $15,000 in attorney's fees and reduced the fees by $22,033.75 without
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explanation. The Trial Court obviously found plaintiff was in need or the court would not
have made the award. In a divorce case, the Trial Court has discretion to award attorney's
fees. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). Such an award is usually based upon
need, and the Trial Court must support the award with adequate findings detailing the
reasonableness of the amount awarded and the amount of the receiving party. Porco v.
Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). The Court of Appeals

also held that where the

Trial Court chooses to reduce the amount of fees requested, the court must make findings
justifying the reduction. Rappleve v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993). It is
plaintiffs request that the Court of Appeals instruct the trial court to award her all of the
fees requested because the fees were reasonable and because of the unwarranted
conduct of defendant. It is plaintiffs contention, that the court should have awarded her
the entire $35,602.25 plus costs of court in the sum of $1,431.50.
VI.

WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES
ON APPEAL.

The Court of Appeals has authority to award attorney's fees and usually does so
based on whether or not the party requesting same prevails on appeal. Bell v. Bell
810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990). In this
case, the plaintiff certainly showed a need for attorney's fees at the trial level and is
requesting such an award on appeal. This request is consistent with previous opinions of
the Court of Appeals.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court issued a memorandum decision setting forth his reasons for
determining why plaintiff should not receive her share of the marital assets. The court
agrees with the plaintiff by stating that the parties income and contributions improved an
$80,000 piece of property to $437,000. The court agrees with the plaintiff that marital
assets were used to purchase three (3) homes and five (5) acres of unimproved property,
together with equipment and cattle. The court then states in its memorandum decision,
under the heading, "rent to be paid by the trust", that since the defendant made oral
agreements with the trust relating to rents or leases that those agreements were valid,
without additional documentation, (see pp 22 of the memorandum decision). On page 22
of the memorandum decision, the Trial Court also stated the following:
"The evidence has convinced the court that the rental agreements were
legitimate bargains between the parties and the trust, even though defendant
acted on both sides of the transactions."
These pronouncement, by the defendant, acting on both sides of the transactions, led the
Trial Court to the conclusion that he should award the plaintiff shares, in a trust controlled
by the defendant and amendable at the whim of the defendant, making said shares
virtually worthless. Before the Court of Appeals was established and set down guidelines
in divorce cases, the type of decision made here was almost impossible to appeal. Now
that guidelines exist, requiring the Trial Court to substantiate such a decision, the plaintiff
can, at least, attack the evidence used by the Trial Court regarding the steps taken in
reaching its conclusion. In this case, that type of evidence, aside from the statement of
the defendant, acting on both sides of the transaction, simply does not exist.
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The failure of the Trial Court to award plaintiff any property and the decision of the
Trial Court allowing the defendant to hide behind the trust, makes it impossible for plaintiff
to gain access to any funds or even collect her attorney's fees. She has no money, no
family home and no place to go. In contrast, the defendant has control of two (2) homes,
the unimproved real property and the property known as the Endrody Ranch, and is
probably in the process of resuming his employment. Every case reviewed by this writer
concerning divorce proceedings discussed the wide latitude and discretion given to the
Trial Judge to take into account all types of property, pre-marital, inherited or gifted, to
make an award in accordance with justice and equity. The award made in this case
certainly has nothing to do with justice or equity.
It is plaintiffs request that the Court of Appeals reverse and remand with
instructions to the Trial Court to do the following:
1. Award plaintiff one-half (1/4) of the property accumulated by the parties
during the marriage. This would include trust property.
2. Impute income to defendant based on historical earnings and award
plaintiff alimony consistent therewith.
3. Award plaintiff property equal in value to one-half (!4) of the property
defendant and his trust sold during the divorce proceedings.
4. Award plaintiff the attorney's fees she incurred prosecuting this matter
through trial.
5. Determine a reasonable attorney's fee for pursuing this appeal and
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award plaintiff that amount.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of March, 1995.

MICHAEL"
for THE PARK FIRM

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that 4-true and correct copy of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT was placed in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class
postage thereon fully prepaid on the 3rd day of April, 1995, addressed to: MICHAEL W.
DAY, SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE, P.O. Box 400, St. George, UT 84771 and
LASZLO ENDRODY, P.O. Box 1083_CedaLO_ity, UT 84720.
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MEMORANDUM
DECISION

CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee
of the ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY
HEINZ, individually, ENDRODY
TRUCKING, INC., a Utah
corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY,
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A.
ENDRODY, LINDA S. M. ENDRODY,
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. ENDRODY,
DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL McGARVEY,
MATILDA McGARVEY, MICKLOS ENDRODY,
MADELEIN L. ENDRODY, HEIDI
MICHELLE ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES
ENDRODY,
Defendants.
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facts.and
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her to do so.
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defendant

marriage
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property
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property at
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the

time

"...real and

which consists
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personal
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at $600,000."
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agreement further provides
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remain
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property
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2
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defendant,
the
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in the
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about 643.77

acres with
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The parties agree that the Ranch
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and the

defendant

agreement by

rights to the

which the

defendant as

voluntary, revocable

Trust.

The

plaintiff.

shares.

as
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Trust or
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transfer of the Ranch to the Trust, as she thought that the Ranch
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as though

discharge of
further

property in the

he were

his fiduciary

provides that

the owner
duties as

upon divorce

trustee may exercise

Trust and

may treat the

thereof, subject
trustee.

of a

The

to the

agreement

beneficiary who

is a

lineal descendant of the trustors from a beneficiary who is not a
lineal

descendant

of

the

trustors,

descendant beneficiary are returned
to

the

descendants

of

the

the

shares

the

non

to the Trust and distributed

divorced

couple,

Therefor, at the

time of trial

Trust, plaintiff

was no longer a beneficiary

to Michael and Linda Endrody,

of

and according

per

stirpes.

the terms of

the

as her shares went

the parties' teenage children,

at

the time this court entered its bifurcated divorce decree.
The

defendant's undivided

1/3

interest in

the Ranch

was

never transferred into the Trust, although defendant assumed that
he had given

up his interest

At

of trial,

the time

by executing the

the defendant

Trust Agreement.

still held

that interest

outside the provisions of the Trust Agreement.
After the creation of the Trust, the defendant
make improvements

to the Ranch, to buy
5

continued to

and sell farm equipment,

to supply

the seed,

labor

and electrical

power needs

of

the

Ranch, to farm and raise livestock, and to pay rental payments to
the

Trust

for the

use

of

the land

and

water.

The

generated by those activities was not the property of

income

the Trust.

The parties and the Trust filed separate tax returns, and for the
years 1987 through 1990 those returns indicate that the
losing

large amounts

of money and

the defendant

earnings from the Canal to pay many of the

farm was

was using his

costs associated with

running the Ranch and buying the equipment and supplies needed to
do so.
During the marriage, the defendant's annual income went from
about $24,000
during

the marriage

with the
and

to over

$120,000.

The

plaintiff did

outside the home.

duties of managing the family,

keeping the

Panama, often

home fires burning

months

at a

time.

She

not

work

was fully occupied

caring for the children

while the

defendant was in

The defendant

sent all

his

earnings home to his father, who handled the defendant's banking.
The father would see that the plaintiff was given enough money to
feed and care for the family until the defendant came home on one
of his long leaves.

The defendant would then pay any outstanding

bills and

the

Panama.
time

stock up

During these

working on

family cupboard

before going

leaves, the defendant

the Ranch, both
6

as his

back

to

spent considerable

second job

and as his

hobby.

The

defendant admits

that he

expected to

Ranch upon the death of his parents prior to the
trust.

Since he

Trust, he has
the

and

treated the Ranch

marriage and

improvements

has spent a

thereon,

creation of the

of the shares

as his own

great deal

to the property.

improvements

distribution

has the majority

inherit the

issued in the

property throughout

of money

As of April

and time on

17, 1992, the Ranch

including sprinklers, wells, water

lines, buildings,

two mobile

homes,

corrals and

fences, were appraised as having a fair market value of $437,000.
The Ranch is currently leased out
harvest

to third parties who raise and

some hay for the Trust and

pay the entire power bill on

the premises, including that used to water Trust hay, in exchange
for the use

of the

property. The

manager of the Ranch,

defendant no

and has resigned

longer acts

as trustee of the

as

Trust

and his daughter by prior marriage has been properly appointed as
trustee.

Since defendant is

the Trust and his

still the majority

shareholder in

daughter is the current trustee,

the court is

convinced that the defendant could resume the position of trustee
at will.
The farm machinery
the Ranch

and equipment being

has been bought by defendant

the marriage, except for the 150
Harvester, the offset

on

from his earnings during

hp JD 4630 tractor, the JD 3960

disc bought in
7

used or located

1970, the flatbed

trailer

turned over to
to Linda.
owned

Endrody Trucking and the

Defendant testified that he had traded in machinery he

prior to

covered

horse trailer belonging

the

marriage which

was

by the premarital agreement but

speculative and unconvincing.
specific

incidents

separate property

or

separate property

and

the evidence thereon is

The defendant was unable to supply

evidence

as to

values

of

the alleged

and any separate character of that property is

untraceable and has been obliterated by commingling, augmentation
and

improvement

undisputed,

using

and clearly

defendant's earnings

marital

funds

and

established by

assets.

It

the evidence,

during the marriage from the

is

that the

farm and from

the Panama Canal employment are marital property.
During the
benefits from
Those

his employment

benefits

parties have

marriage the defendant

began to

a proper

one

half

Defendant has

prior to

Canal Commission.

the

marriage.

The

agreed that the Court should promulgate a qualified
to be

calculation can

benefit was accrued
to

with the Panama

accrue

domestic relations order
that

was acquiring retirement

of

forwarded to
be done

during the marriage.
that

benefit

now retired

accrued

from the

as to

how much

so

of the

Plaintiff is entitled
during

Panama Canal

receives a monthly benefit of $2442 per month.

8

the Commission

the

marriage.

and currently

During

the

marriage

additional properties

the

parties or

which present

the

issues

Trust

in this

acquired
case.

In

1982, the parties bought a home in Cedar City which they paid for
with

marital funds.

plaintiff

and

The

title to

the defendant

as

the home

trustees

children

of the parties, Michael and Linda.

created,

the Cedar

with

the

agreement of

Plaintiff received
agreement

City house

to

both

the

for

the

the plaintiff

City

minor

After the Trust was

and

shares in the

Cedar

by the

two

was transferred into

70 additional

transfer

was taken

the Trust,

the defendant.
Trust upon

house

to

the

her

Trust.

Thereafter, the parties paid rent to the Trust for the use of the
house.

The

defendant

has occupied

this

home

during

these

proceedings and is being assessed rent by the Trust.
During the marriage the defendant bought 5 acres of
Enoch City

land in

which was paid for with Trust funds and deeded to the

defendant as trustee for the Trust.
During the marriage

the defendant

bought a

home in

Enoch

City, in which plaintiff has resided by order of the court during
the pendency

of these proceedings.

Trust funds and title was
Trust.

That home

was paid

taken by defendant as trustee

During the time the

parties resided in that

paid rent to the trust for the use of the premises.
the current trustee

of the Trust,
9

for by
for the

home, they
Patty Heinz,

has testified that

once this

divorce case is

decided, the Trust will

seek the ouster

of the

plaintiff from the Enoch home and will hold defendant responsible
for

all losses

the

Trust

has

suffered during

the

time

the

plaintiff has occupied the home without paying the required rent.
The 1969
asset,

it

mobile home

having

been

located

on the

Ranch is

purchased during

parties and paid for with marital

funds.

the

a

marriage

marital
by the

The larger mobile home

located on the Ranch, and occupied by defendant's mother,

is not

the property of the parties, but belongs to Matilda Endrody.
During
Drive

the Trust

bought a

in Enoch City which was paid

the use
sold

the marriage

of which the Trust

be the

Blue Sky

for with Trust funds and for

collected rent.

Trust, through Patty

home on

That

Heinz as

home has been

trustee, during the

pendency of these proceedings to reduce the debt of the Trust.
Plaintiff

is currently

toward a secretarial
work
job.

force after

enrolled

degree.

that in a

in

college

She hopes to be
secretarial or

and

working

able to enter the
office manager type

Plaintiff suffers from several illnesses and takes various

medications which limit

the types of work she can

worked just prior to this

marriage.

do.

Her degree will

She last
require at

least 2 years to complete.
Defendant
the

also hopes to return to

resolution of

this case,

the work force following

although he
10

will not be

able to

return to the Panama Canal because of his physical condition.

He

hopes to find

or

mate.

employment in the merchant

However,

custody

he is

currently caring

of the two teenage children of

quite ill and
problems

were to

go

requires lengthy absences.

back to

for and

has temporary

the parties. Michael is

requires constant care.

if he

marine as a master

Child care
sea as

would create

that line

of work

Plaintiff has indicated that she

is

not interested in taking physical custody of the children at this
time but would do so

if anything happened to the

defendant. The

parties have agreed that the court should award joint

custody to

them,

reasonable

with

physical custody

to

the

defendant and

rights of visitation to the plaintiff.
During the marriage the defendant set up a corporation known
as Endrody Trucking.
and several
The

court

The initial

later contributions
finds

that

the

contribution to that

were made from

stock

or

other

company

marital assets.
interest

in that

corporation held by either of the parties is marital property.
The parties
during

the

acquired two

marriage.

The

pick up trucks

parties

and one

have stipulated

Cadillac
that

the

Cadillac is the plaintiff's separate property and the two pick up
trucks belong to the Trust.

The 1978 Chrysler Cordoba automobile

is a marital asset having a value of $300.
At

time of

trial the

parties own
11

no cattle in

their own

name.
herd

At the time the case was filed, the parties owned a large
of cattle.

defendant

During the

has sold

those

pendency of

cattle in

violation

restraining order.

The defendant was

court following a

hearing held December

determination
hearing

was stayed, as

all

the evidence

these proceedings the

found in contempt
14, 1992.

the court wanted

before

of the

deciding

court's
by the

The penalty

the advantage of

on the

appropriate

penalty for the sale of the cattle.
During the

trial, plaintiff's evidence showed

incurred

attorney fees

costs in

the total amount of $1431.50.

no

evidence on

regarding the

in the

total amount

his attorney fees,

of $35,602.25

and

The defendant presented

nor did

reasonableness of the

that she had

he present evidence

fees and costs

incurred by

plaintiff.
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
Plaintiff
into by

contends that

the

premarital agreement

the parties should be invalidated

under coercion

entered

because she signed it

and without full disclosure.

The courts of this

State have clearly held that antenuptial agreements are valid and
enforceable
validated

with
if the

certain

exceptions.

evidence demonstrates

Such

agreements

that the

agreement was

entered into voluntarily without coercion or fraud, and
was material disclosure of assets.
12

[See Nielson v,

are

if there

Nielson. 780

p.2d 1264; Hunk v. Huck,

734 P. 2d

417; Berman v,

Berman^ 749

P.2d 1271.]
The evidence in this case demonstrates no coercion, fraud or
involuntariness.

Plaintiff testified that prior

to the signing

of the agreement she was aware of the Ranch and its improvements,
having visited

there

herself.

The

agreement came

up for the first

question of

a

premarital

time in Panama just

before the

marriage was to take place but the plaintiff testified there were
no

threats, no

that

ultimatum, no duress

there would

be

no marriage

or coercion.

if she

She assumed

refused

to sign

the

agreement but the defendant made no such statement or indication.
Further, plaintiff had

no objection to signing

she assumed that the Ranch would be
defendant

after

the

continue to be hers
the

marriage,

the separate property of the

just as

her

after the marriage.

existence of coercion

the agreement as

belongings

The burden of

is born by the

would

proving

plaintiff and she has

failed to carry that burden in this case.
The

evidence in

disclosure,
disclosure

this case

however.
consists

does demonstrate

The plaintiff
of

the

overvaluation of

cattle, its

accounts and equipment.

the

of $600,000

figure

agreement.

was

He admits that the

argues

material nonthat

the

The defendant

not accurate

at

the

non-

Ranch,

admits that

the time

of the

property was worth far less
13

its

than

that amount.

The

court holds, however,

that an error

of that

type does not constitute material non-disclosure.
The plaintiff was familiar with the property included in the
agreement.

There was

no confusion, nor was

overvaluation of that

property.

She

could keep the described property
at the value he gave it.
material

disclosure

opportunity to
agreementduring

defendant

as his separate property

even

provide

the agreeing

party

a full

assess what he or she is giving up- by signing the

disclosure the

when the

agreed that the

the

The purpose of the requirement of full,

is to

Obviously

ability to

she misled, by

if

the property

other

party

is greatly

has

been deprived

properly determine what is being

value of

the

property has

undervalued

given up.

been overstated,

of

the

However,
and

the

agreeing party decides to sign anyway, he or she has had adequate
disclosure to make a reasoned decision.
absolute accuracy

in disclosure.

The law does not require

The overvaluation of the Ranch

was not material non-disclosure as the court can presume
the

true value

of the property

had been

that if

disclosed, being less

than the amount stated, the plaintiff would have entered into the
agreement all

the more readily, as she would have been giving up

less than she chose to give up in this agreement.
The

court finds,

however, that

the agreement

executed by

these parties did not make the required material disclosure as to
14

that portion of the document which provided:
"The parties intend and desire that all real and personal
property on the Endrody Ranch in Iron County,
including
accounts, cattle and machinery shall remain the
separate
property of the prospective husband, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR. ,
regardless of any loans or payments made on the ranch,
accounts, cattle, or machinery during the
marriage."
No

where in

nature of the
nature

the agreement is

indebtedness on the Ranch

of any accounts

evidence

is

and

now an
time

to

amounts of

the

of its

this

this case the
marriage

Ranch, to buy
needs

of

the
were

cattle and
the

Ranch

arrangement is that the Ranch "is

escalated in value

purchase prior to

last appraisal.

In

or the

his earnings, which

farming

The effect of this

asset which has

or other assets

throughout

to improve the

supply

indication of the

hold or owe.

that

using large

clearly marital funds,

enterprise.

it may

persuasive

defendant was

machinery

there any

from $80,000

the marriage to

at the

$437,000 at the

The defendant has effectively provided himself a

way to transform marital earnings

into his separate property, at

will,

in connection

be simply

using the money

The agreement does not reveal that such was the
the parties.
knew of or

Nor is there any evidence

agreed to such an outcome.

to reveal that
his separate

he intended to

contemplation of

that the plaintiff ever
Failure of the defendant

make significant improvements

property from marital assets and

improvements as

with the Ranch.

his own separate
15

to

then to claim the

property constituted

material

non-disclosure.
In addition, the enforcement of the above quoted portion
the

agreement

circumstances

would

be

in this

substantially

case.

unfair

Antenuptial

under

the

agreements, or

some

portion thereof, may be invalidated because
Nielson V.

Nielsen, and Berman v. Berman.

of

of unfairness. [See

cited above.]

During

the marriage the defendant earned well over $100,000 per year for
several years from his employment.

The evidence shows

that much

of that money was spent improving the Ranch and its assets, which
the defendant
upon the

expected individually

death of his parents.

provision of

to inherit,, own

Were the court

the agreement, it would result

since the controlling

interest in

other

personal property

on the

is now

held by

a

If the

machinery and

Ranch, including

its accounts,

cattle, and machinery were also to be held the
of

to enforce this

in an unfair result

the Ranch

Trust controlled largely by the defendant.

or control

separate property

the defendant, the plaintiff would walk away from 17 years of

marriage
amassed

with

precious

a considerable

result is

little
fortune

not fair and was

and the

defendant

using marital

not within the

would

funds.

have

Such

a

contemplation of the

parties at the time of the agreement.
Accordingly,

the court

holds

that the

provisions of

the

Antenuptial Property Agreement according separate property status
16

to personal

property on

and machinery regardless
during the

of any loans

marriage is unenforceable.

that any improvements
marriage

the Ranch, including

to real property

which were

defendant's separate

paid for

or payments made

thereon

Further the

court holds

of the Ranch

during the

with marital

property by

accounts, cattle,

funds are

the agreement for

not made

the reasons

cited above.
The

court

invalidates the

must

next

consider

entire premarital

whether

agreement.

The

this

holding

Utah Supreme

Court has held, in Nielson V, Nielson^ :
"Where the offending provision [of an antenuptial
agreement] is separable from the rest of the contract, the
non-offending provisions are enforceable."
The

court

finds

that

the

offending

provision

in

the

agreement at hand is separable from the remaining portions of the
agreement.

Therefore,

enforceable

except as

the

to

agreement is

the

declared

offending provisions

valid

and

identified

above.
In

applying the

defendant's interest
Ranch at

agreement to the

facts in

in the real property

this case, the

which constituted the

the time of the marriage would be the separate property

of the defendant, as would any increase in value of that property
attributable solely to the independent forces of the market place

17

and the

economy, including inflationary

Jur. 2d

Section 891, p. 872;

(Utah 1990);

Burt v.

Burt.

factors1.

Dunn v. Dunn, 802
799 P.2d

[See

24 Am.

p.2d 1314, 1320

1166, 1168

(Utah

1990)3

However, any increase in value attributable to the expenditure of
marital funds

on repairs, improvements, new

like is a marital

asset subject to division by

24 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 892; Burt v. Burt.
Dunn, cited above.)
held

by defendant

maintained
marital

Likewise, any
at the

separate

funds, would

defendant.

acquisitions or the

time of

and paid
remain

for
the

this court. (See

cited above; Dunn v.

interest in personal property
the

marriage and

without
separate

which was

the application
property

of

of
the

However, any interest in an item of personal property

acquired after

the marriage and paid for

x

by marital funds would

In Dunn v. Dunn, page 1320, the Court of Appeals held:
"The general rule is that equity requires that each
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the
marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property.
(Citations omitted)
Exceptions to this general rule include
whether the property has been commingled, whether the other
spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or
protected the separate property, and whether the distribution
achieves a fair, just, and equitable result."
It is clear from the evidence in this case that plaintiff
has augmented and maintained the property of the defendant by his
use of marital funds to improve his separate property.
In
addition, this court finds unfair and inequitable a property
distribution that would leave the defendant with the principle
assets of the marriage and all the value they have accrued
because he used marital funds to increase that value during the
marriage, even though one half of those funds must be attributed
to the efforts of the plaintiff.
18

be a marital asset, subject to division by the court.

THE ENDRQDY TRUST
Much of the
creation
October

litigation in this case has

of the
5,

Endrody Trust by

1984.

At

the time

defendant and
of

Agreement, the

defendant's parents,

2/3

interest

undivided

in

transferred to the Trust.
was

held by

Trust.

defendant.

Plaintiff

the

trustee, and

Ranch.

Their

defendants

in this

lawsuit.

of its
The

the Trust
title to

interest

was

undivided interest

interest was never

some

of

as trustors, held

now attacks the Trust and has

Trust, its

his parents on

the signing

The remaining 1/3
That

been caused by the

deeded to the
even joined the

current beneficiaries

plaintiff has

as

been unable to

direct the court to any authority which would allow this court to
invalidate or set aside the Trust under the circumstances of this
case.
The plaintiff's primary complaint
placed marital assets in the Trust.
is no

basis for

trustors

for the

setting aside
benefit

beneficiaries unrelated

of

is that the defendant has

Even if such is the case, it

a Trust
the

created by

parties, as

to this divorce action.

third party

well

as

other

A court cannot

invade a trust established for a lawful purpose where there is no
showing that
influence,

the

trust

or mistake,

was

created by

unless all
19

fraud,

parties in

duress, undue
interest consent

properly to the revocation.
138)

(See 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 101, P.

The court is required to give

effect to the intent of the

trustors who created the trust, absent such a showing.
Plaintiff has also pointed to some actions by

the defendant

while serving as trustee as grounds for setting aside the trust.
The

general

because

rule is

of

the

that

a trust

misconduct

of

does

the

not

trustee,

terminate merely
his

neglect

inability to manage the trust, or inattention to it.

or

(See 76 Am.

Jur. 2d, Section 106, p. 141.)
In

short the

show that the
court

to

Trust should be

adopt

corporations

plaintiff has failed

and

the

declines to do so.

set aside.

alter

to apply

ego
it

in this

alter ego

of the defendant, even though

which

the

prevail.

This

the Trust

consented
Trust. She

Trust is

of

The court

he enjoyed broad powers

take shares
20

The evidence
other parties

that they paid

Plaintiff

contribution of

agreed to

Trust.

the benefit of the Trust and

Both parties admit

Trust properties.
to the

law

obviously not the

included property of

was managed by defendant for

use of

the

situation.

and majority shareholder of the

its beneficiaries.

from

the

However, even if the court were to do so, the

could not

demonstrates that

her burden to

Plaintiff urges

doctrine

plaintiff

as trustee

to carry

even admits

the Cedar
in the

City house

Trust

rent for
that she
to the

in return

for

whatever interest she

might have in that

treated by

all concerned as a separate

forms were

observed, and

duty as trustee
defendant bought

was under

Trust was

a continuing

his fiduciary duties.

and sold and financed and

trustee of the trust

The

legal entity, the proper

the defendant

to perform properly

house.

The

paid for property as

and there is no showing

that he commingled

the affairs of the Trust and his personal affairs.
Therefor
vivos

the court

trust and

holds that the

that the

claims of

Trust is

a valid inter

the plaintiff

against the

Trust, its beneficiaries, and its trustee are unsupported.
claims are

hereby ordered

dismissed.

held by the Trust, including the
Cedar City house, the 5 acres

Accordingly

the

in Enoch, the Enoch house, and the

to the Trust

distribution

parties as

items of property

the property

2/3 interest in the Ranch,

personal property belonging
between these

Those

are not available
marital assets

belong to a third party. (See

for

as those

24 Am. Jur. 2d,

Section 896.)
However, the

court also holds that the

shares in the Trust

held by the defendant as beneficiary are marital property in view
of

the

fact that

marriage,

defendant

has increased

acquired those

the value

of those

shares

during the

shares during

the

marriage by the use of marital funds and the application of large
amounts

of time and effort

otherwise belonging to the marriage,
21

and has returned all earnings from the Ranch to the Ranch and the
Trust, to the

exclusion of plaintiff.

that 550 1/2 of the

The court

hereby orders

defendant's shares in the Trust are

held by

him Subject to a constructive trust imposed by this court.

He is

to hold only title to those shares in trust for the plaintiff and
she

is

awarded

including

the

voting

full

rights

benefit
and

and

the

use

right

of
to

those shares,
any

property

distribution attributable to those shares.
RENT PAID TQ THE TRUST
Inherent

in

plaintiff's position

is

the

claim that

the

payments of rent which the parties made to the Trust

for the use

of

constituted

Trust

property

were

impermissible augmentation
The

plaintiff would

Trust responsible
has

convinced

legitimate
though

this

court

that

hold the

be

rental

parties

on both sides

in question,

and

of the

it a

house or

property.

defendant and the
The evidence

agreements

were

the Trust,

even

transactions.

granted a leasehold

paid the rent and were

Trust for those payments.
to prove

and

with marital

the

between the

the parties were

parties actually

failed

of the Trust

have the court

defendant acted

the property

improper

for this perceived impropriety.

bargains

each instance

somehow

the

In

interest in
Ranch.

.The

held responsible by the

The court finds that the plaintiff has

that the rents

were unreasonable
22

or that they

were

not given

in exchange for

value which both parties

a return

enjoyed.

benefit of comparable

In essence, the Trust

was in

the same position as any other landlord vis-a-vis these parties.
ENPRQPY TRUCKING CORPORATION
Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges that the entity
known

as

Endrody

property.
should

Trucking

(hereinafter

"Corp.")

The plaintiff does not allege that the

be

pierced or

applied in

this case.

that

the alter

ego

Certainly there

is

marital

corporate veil

doctrine

has been

should be

no

evidence

presented which would justify such action

by this court.

other

the evidence

hand, it

would appear

clear from

On the

that any

interest of the parties or stock in that Corp., whether acquired
in the name of the defendant or the plaintiff, must be treated as
marital property, having been acquired with marital funds.
RETIREMENT
The parties have stipulated that the parties are entitled to
a

proportionate

share

of

the

retirement

benefit

that

defendant now receives from the Panama Canal Commission.
the

benefit

married.

relates

The

attributable to
parties
date.

and

to

the period

plaintiff
the period

ending

is

entitled

defendant's

is to
23

the

to 1/2

beginning with

with the

Plaintiff's counsel

before

of

Some of

parties
the

the marriage

the

were

benefit
of the

effective retirement

prepare a qualified

domestic

relations

order

necessary

for signature

arrangements

with

entitlement

can

plaintiff's

by

the court

the

and

Commission

be properly

to
so

calculated

make the
that

the

and

paid

directly to her.
CUSTODY AND CHTDD SUPPORT
In

accordance

with the

parties

are hereby

awarded

stipulation
joint

custody

children of the marriage, with physical

of

the parties,

of

the

two

the

minor

custody to the defendant

and reasonable rights of visitation to the plaintiff.
The issue
entered its

of child support is reserved

final decision as to the

until the court has

property and debt division

as detailed hereafter.
PROPKRTY DIVISION
The
dispute

first task

of the

is to identify

property,

has begun

above

relating

Agreement,

property in

item is separate

a third

entering the

Antenuptial

Corp., and other matters.
in this

or property of

that analysis in
to the

dividing the

whether any particular

marital property

court

court in

party.

The

rulings set out
the Trust,

the

Applying those rulings to the evidence

case, the court now determines

that the following items

are separate property of the parties:
PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE PROPERTY:
1.

All

furnishings now
24

located

in

the Enoch

house

except that belonging to Linda Endrody,
2. The Cadillac automobile, and
3. All personal items of property identifiable as being
owned by plaintiff prior to the marriage.
(The parties stipulated

during the trial

that the Cadillac

and

the furnishings in the Enoch house could be so treated.)
DEFENDANT'S SEPARATE PROPERTY:
1. A 1/3 undivided interest in the Ranch except for any
increase in value attributable to use of marital funds,
2. Any equipment, machinery

or other personal property

owned prior to the marriage and used on the Ranch, and
3. Any equipment, machinery or other
in which

the defendant

marriage except for

held

an interest

personal property

at the

time

of the

any value attributable to the expenditure of

marital funds.
The following

are items of marital property which should be

divided equally and fairly between the parties.
MARITAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES:
1. Any

value of

the defendant's

1/3 interest

in the

Ranch attributable to the use of marital funds or assets.
2.

Any

farm machinery,

equipment

or other

personal

property acquired during the marriage.
3. Any holdings, stock or other interest in the Corp.,
25

4. The identified retirement benefit,
5. Any other vehicles,

furnishings, cash, earnings, or

property not specifically discussed

above which were acquired by

either party during the marriage,
6. The shares held by defendant in the Trust, the court
having ordered that 1/2 of the shares in the Trust which are held
in the name of the defendant as of the

time of trial are subject

to a constructive trust and are held by defendant for the use and
benefit of plaintiff,
7.

Any tax

refunds attributable

to any

part of

the

acquired during

the

period of the marriage,
8.
marriage by

Any

mobile home

or

the parties, except

trailer

the horse trailer

belonging to

Linda Endrody,
The court having now determined
in this case and having
various

items of

appropriate

to

applied

entered certain orders herein as to

property
set this

the law to be

are

to

matter

be treated,

for

further

it

now

how
seems

argument or

the

presentation of evidence on the following matters:
1. The

values to

be

fixed for

the various

property

interests identified above for separate and marital property.
2. The

value

of

the

parties, and whether outstanding

debts and

obligations

of

the

debts are chargeable as marital
26

obligations or individual obligations.
3.

The proper

division

of

marital property

between

these parties.
4.

Determination

of

a

proper

alimony

award after-

property and debts have been valued and divided.
5. Determination

of a proper

child support assessment

after property and debts have been valued and divided.
6. Determination regarding

the assessment of

attorney

fees, after the property and debts have been valued and divided.
7. Any remaining unresolved issues.
Accordingly,
Motion Calendar
County

this

matter is

on October

ordered

4, 1993,

at 9:00

Courthouse in Parowan, Utah for

may become necessary.
be present at the
The trust

set on
AM,

the

Law and

in the

Iron

review and scheduling as

The plaintiff and defendant are ordered to

above time and place along with their counsel.

defendants

need not

attend, but

choose, in person ajnd/or by counsel.
Dated ^J^fe^nofr^ ?Q.
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may do

so if

they

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on this

day of September,

1993, I mailed true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
MEMORANDUM DECISION, first class postage prepaid, to the
following:
James M. Park, Esq.
P. 0. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84721-0765

Lasslo Endrody, Jr.
P. 0. Box 1083
Cedar City, UT 84721-1083

Michael A. Day, Esq.
90 East 200 North
P. 0. Box 400
St. George, UT 84770

OdJllkfi,
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ,
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC.
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY,
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A.
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY,
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M.
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY,
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L.
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES
ENDRODY,

Civil No. 914900027
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. The Court
previously entered a Memorandum Decision, on September 21, 1993, which left open
certain issues to be addressed at the November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, after
hearing additional evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the
following Findings of Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that its Memorandum decision, filed on September 21,

1993, should be incorporated into these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
said Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein
by this reference.
2.

The Court finds that it is clear and unambiguous that the Defendant

transferred his one-third interest in the ranch property to the Endrody Trust on or about
October 9,1984, upon which transfer of all of the reanch property had been conveyed
to the Endrody Trust. The provisions of the Court's Memorandum Decision indicating
that the Defendant had retained a one-third undivided interest in the ranch property, or
that only two-thirds of the ranch property was conveyed to and held by the Endrody
Trust, should be amended and modified to incorporate this finding.
3.

With respect to the Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, the Court

finds that the Endrody Trust is a valid inter vivos trust, that the claims of the Plaintiff
against the Trust, its beneficiary and its trustees are unsupported and should be
dismissed, and that the property held by Endrody Trust, including the ranch property,
the Cedar City home, the 5 acres in Enoch, the Enoch home, and the personal
property belonging to the Endrody Trust are not marital assets and are not available
for distribution between Plaintiff and the Defendant, but are items of property
belonging to the Endrody Trust.
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4.

The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital

assets and should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Court finds that these items of farm
equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage:
Equipment

Value

a.

Cultivator

$150.00

b.

Snapper Lawnmower

c.

JD Lawnmower

$400.00

d.

Heston Swather

$5,500.00

e.

Double rake

f.

Wire baler

g.

Corn planter

h.

Leveler

i.

JD 2750 Tractor

$13,000.00

j.

JD 3 bottom plow

$1,500.00

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff:
5.

$75.00

$75.00
$5,000.00
$500.00
$2,500.00

$29,325.00

The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital

assets and should be awarded to the Defendant. The Court finds that these items of
farm equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage:
Equipment
a.

Hoe and Bale Wagon

b.

Hay loader

c.

JD 4230 Tractor

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant:

Value

$12,000.00
$1,000.00

$13,500.00
$26,500.00

The Court also finds that the Defendant should be awarded, as his separate
property, other items of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which were
acquired by the Defendant prior to the parties' marriage.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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6.

The Court finds that various cattle were acquired and sold during the

period of the parties1 marriage, but that all cattle have been sold and no division of
cattle is necessary.
7.

The Court finds that the parties have acquired 6,000 shares of stock in

Endrody Trucking, Inc., during the period of the marriage; that said shares should be
treated as marital property; and that it is fair and equitable that the Plaintiff receive
3,000 shares and the Defendant receive 3,000 shares.
8.

The debts acquired by the parties during the period of their marriage,

including any periods of separation, should be assumed and satisfied as follows,
except as otherwise provided herein:
a.

Plaintiff should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred by

her during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties'
separation;
b.

Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred

by him during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties'
separation; and
c.

The Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debt owed

to Mark McKim.
9.

The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the care, custody

and control of the parties' minor children, Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody
and that Plaintiff should be entitled to reasonable rights of visitation with said children.
10.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant, as and for

child support for the parties' minor children, $177.00 per month, which amount is
consistent with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The Court further finds that
any modification of child support should be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's
Child Support Guidelines. Said child support payments should continue until each
child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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child support obligations in the event that either of the parties' minor children has
special needs which warrant a continuation of child support.
11.

The Court finds that each party should be required to keep and maintain

medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor children, when it is available
to them at a reasonable cost or through their respective employment. Each party
should be required to pay one-half of all medical and dental expenses incurred by the
parties1 minor children which are not covered by health or dental insurance.
12.

The Court finds that the Defendant should prepare and submit

documentation of insurance records and medical and dental bills to the Plaintiff, and
that the Plaintiff should be required to reimburse the Defendant for one-half of those
expenses if there are medical or dental expenses which are not covered by then
existing insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the parties' children and
to pay those medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, should end as
each child reaches the age of majority.
13.

The Court finds that rent was incurred by the Plaintiff, due to her

occupation and possession of the Enoch home, belonging to the Endrody Trust, at the
rate of $850.00 per month over a 24 month period, for a total rent due and owing to the
Endrody Trust of $20,400.00. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible
to pay and satisfy one-half of this rent amount, being $10,200.00, and that the
Defendant should be responsible to pay and satisfy the remaining one-half of said rent
amount being $10,200.00.
14.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony from the

Defendant in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of
December, 1993. Alimony should terminate upon the death, remarriage or
cohabitation of the Plaintiff or upon further Order of the Court. This alimony award is
based upon the Court's finding that the Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that the
Defendant has the ability to pay a reasonable sum for alimony, and the Court finds
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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that, based upon the respective circumstances of the parties, $300.00 per month is a
reasonable sum for alimony.
15.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's evidence at trial showed that she had

incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $35,602.25, with costs in the total amount of
$1,431.50. The Defendant should be required to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's
fees, the sum of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the
Defendant toward Plaintiff's attorney's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing the
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees.
16.

The Court finds that the Defendant was previously found in contempt of

Court and that the Defendant should pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff for said contempt,
which amount will reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably
incurred by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant's contempt.
17.

The Court finds that the 1,101 shares held by Defendant in the Endrody

Trust are marital assets and should be equally divided between the parties; that 550
1/2 shares should be awarded to Plaintiff and should be held in constructive trust by
the Defendant, under which the Defendant should continue to hold title to said shares
and Plaintiff should be awarded full use and benefit of said shares, including voting
and distribution rights. The Court further finds that if the Trust makes any distribution,
in any form, to its shareholders, then that portion of said distribution associated with
Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares should be held by Defendant, in trust for
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff should be offered her portion of any distribution to shareholders
before any other application of the funds, including reinvestment.
18.

The Court finds that the Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in

connection with the above-referenced constructive trust, and that Defendant should
forward to Plaintiff any notices or information disseminated by the trust to Defendant,
regarding trust meetings or other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial
interest in the trust shares or her rights with respect thereto.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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19.

The Court finds that the parties have stipulated that Plaintiff is entitled to

one-half of all retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant from the date of the
parties marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until the Defendant retired on or
about December 14,1991. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to onehalf of the retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant during that period of time.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, concludes that the
foregoing findings constitute a complete and final determination of the Court relating to
issues of the case of Endrody v. Endrody. Iron County Civil No. 914900027, and that a
Decree and Judgment should be made and entered in accordance therewith.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ,
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC.,|
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY,
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A.
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY,
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M.
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY,
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L.
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES
ENDRODY,

Civil No. 914900027
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of
record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. After trial of
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the matter on August 25, 26 and 27, 1993, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision,
on September 21, 1993, which left open certain issues to be addressed at the
November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, having heard additional evidence, and being
fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, its real and personal property

and its trustees and beneficiaries and against Endrody Trucking, Inc., are dismissed,
with prejudice.
2.

The marital assets of the Plaintiff and Defendant, acquired during the

course of their marriage, are divided and awarded as follows:
a.

There is no real property owned by the Plaintiff and Defendant and

no division of real property is necessary.
b.

Personal property:
(1)

To the Plaintiff:

Equipment

Value

a)

Cultivator

$150.00

b)

Snapper Lawnmower

c)

JD Lawnmower

$400.00

d)

Heston Swather

$5,500.00

e)

Double rake

f)

Wire baler

g)

Corn planter

h)

Leveler

i)

JD 2750 Tractor

$13,000.00

j)

JD 3 bottom plow

$1,500.00

$75.00

$75.00
$5,000.00
$500.00
$2,500.00

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff:

Judgment and Decree
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(2)

To the Defendant:

Equipment
a)

Hoe and Bale Wagon

b)

Hay loader

c)

JD 4230 Tractor

Value
$12,000.00
$1,000.00
$13,500.00

Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant:
c.

$26,500.00

Defendant is awarded, as his separate property, other items

of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which are not listed above and
which were acquired by the Defendant prior to the marriage of Plaintiff and
Defendant.
d.

All other items of personal property acquired by Plaintiff and

Defendant during the course of the marriage shall be held by the party now in
possession of such personal property, in accordance with the prior Orders of the
Court, which are not inconsistent with this Judgment and Decree.
3.

There are currently no cattle which are owned by the Plaintiff and

Defendant, and no award or division of cattle is necessary.
4.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded 3,000 shares of stock in

Endrody Trucking, Inc.
5.

The Plaintiff and Defenant are ordered to assume and satisfy the debts

incurred during the period of their marriage, including any periods of separation, in the
following manner:
a.

Plaintiff is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by her individually

during the period of the marriage and during the period of her separation from
Defendant;
b.

Defendant is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by him

individually during the period of the marriage and during the period of his separation
from Plaintiff;
Judgment and Decree
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c.

The Defendant is also ordered to satisfy any indebtedness owed by

either Plaintiff or Defendant to Mark McKim.
6.

Defendant is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children,

Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody, and Plaintiff is granted reasonable rights
of visitation with said children.
7.

Plaintiff should pay to Defendant, as and for the benefit and support of the

minor children, $177.00 per month, as and for child support, which amount is consistent
with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Any future modification of child support
shall be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's Child Support Guidelines. Said child
support payments shall continue until each child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with
the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue the child support obligations of Defendant in
the event that either of the minor children has special needs which warrant a
continuation of child support.
8.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to keep and maintain medical

and dental insurance for the benefit of their minor children, when such insurance
coverage is available to either or both of them at a reasonable cost or through their
respective employment. Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to pay one-half of all
medical and dental expenses incurred by the minor children for any medical or dental
expenses which are not covered by health or dental insurance.
9.

Defendant is ordered to prepare and submit documentation of medical and

dental bills of the minor children, together with documentation on insurance payments
for such bills, and Plaintiff is ordered to pay directly, or, where appropriate, to reimburse
the Defendant for one-half of those expenses which are not covered by then existing
insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the minor children and to pay for
medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, shall end as each child reaches
the age of majority.

Judgment and Decree
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10.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, the sum of

$10,200.00, representing one-half of the past due rents owed to Endrody Trust for
Plaintiff's occupation and possession of a Trust owned residence. Defendant is ordered
to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, $10,200.00, representing one-half of the past
due rents owed to Endrody Trust as a result of Plaintiff's occupation and possession of a
Trust owned residence.
11.

Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony and Defendant is ordered to pay

alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of
December, 1993. Defendant's obligation to pay alimony to Plaintiff shall terminate upon
the death, remarriage or cohabitation of Plaintiff, or upon further Order of the Court.
12.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's fees, the sum

of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the Defendant
toward Plaintiff's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing and is ordered to pay the
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees incurred in this matter.
13.

As a result of the Court's prior finding of contempt against the Defendant,

the Defendant is ordered to pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff, which amount is meant to
reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably associated with
Defendant's contempt.
14.

The Court orders that the 1,101 shares in Endrody Trust, which are

currently held by Defendant, be awarded to the parties as follows:
a.

With respect to 550 1/2 of said shares, Defendant should continue

to hold title to said shares and continue to exercise all rights and receive all benefits
associated with said shares, including voting rights and rights of distribution.
b.

With respect to the remaining 550 1/2 shares, said shares should

be held in constructive trust by Defendant, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff. Defendant
shall continue to hold title to said shares, while Plaintiff is awarded full use and benefit of
said shares, including voting and distribution rights.
Judgment and Decree
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c.

In accordance with the above-referenced constructive trust, upon

any distribution to shareholders by the trust, Defendant is ordered to hold that portion of
said distribution associated with Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares, and
Defendant is ordered to notify Plaintiff of said distribution and to offer Plaintiff her portion
of any such distribution before any other application of the funds, including
reinvestment.
d.

Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in connection with the

above-referenced constructive trust, and Defendant is ordered to forward to Plaintiff any
notices or information provided to Defendant by the Trust, regarding Trust meetings or
other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial interest in the trust shares or her
rights with respect thereto.
15.

Plaintiff is awarded one-half of the retirement benefits accumulated by

Defendant, from the date of the parties' marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until
the Defendant retired on or about December 14,1991.
16.

The parties shall cooperate in executing such documents as may be

necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Judgment and Decree.
17.

Should any party fail to comply with the provisions of this Judgment and

Decree, the nondefaulting party shall be entitled to any costs or expenses, including
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in enforcing the provisions hereof.
18.

This Judgment and Order shall become final immediately upon entry by

the Court.

Judgment and Decree
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Approved as to Form and Content

J^MES-R^PfkTE^Q.
The P a r k - F i r m — - ^
Attorneys for Plaintiff

LASZLO ENDRODY, JR.
Defendant, Pro Se

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

_, 1994,1 served a copy

of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND DECREE on each of the following by depositing a
copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
James M. Park, Esq.
THE PARK FIRM
965 South Main, #3
PO Box 765
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Laszlo Endrody, Jr.
PO Box 1083
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083
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Judgment and Decree
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JAMES M. PARK, ESQ
The Park-Fin
Attorneys for/Plaintiff

LASZLO ENDRODY, 4
Defendant, Pro Se

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of ()£&£•

. 1994,1 served a copy

of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND DECREE on each of the following by depositing a
copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
James M. Park, Esq.
THE PARK FIRM
965 South Main, #3
PO Box 765
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Laszlo Endrody, Jr.
PO Box 1083
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083
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